Introduction
There are two main approaches to specifying monetary policy in the literature; optimal policy and simple instrument rules. By 'optimal policy'we here mean minimizing a speci…c loss function using all information embedded in the model. 1 'Simple instrument rules', on the other hand, specify how the monetary policy instrument -the key interest rate -should respond to a subset of the information available to the policy maker. The original Taylor (1993) rule is an example of a simple rule where the central bank responds to a subset of the information set, i.e., the rate of in ‡ation and the output gap. By construction, simple rules lead to higher loss than optimal policy when evaluated in a given model, but the excess loss depends both on how restricted the simple rule is and on the model.
In addition to providing a rough description of actual policy, simple rules have a normative motivation; they are considered more robust to model uncertainty than optimal policy. Taylor and Wieland (2012) provide a survey and discussion of the literature on simple robust rules. In the literature, the model simulations are commonly based on the assumption that the central bank commits to the simple rule in a mechanical way. However, as pointed out by Svensson (2003) , full commitment to a simple rule like the Taylor rule is unrealistic, and no central bank does this in practice. Svensson therefore rejects simple rules, both from a positive and from a normative perspective. He advocates instead optimal policy (or 'targeting rules ') and argues that this is a more reasonable description of monetary policy, as the central bank is treated as an optimizing agent in the same way as households and …rms, and that optimal policy leads to better outcomes than simple rules.
Although Svensson's critique may be justi…ed, the fact that central banks do not commit to following simple instrument rules like the Taylor rule mechanically, does not imply that monetary policy is not in ‡uenced by such rules at all. On the contrary, we …nd it reasonable to assume that monetary policy in practice has, at least to some extent, been in ‡uenced by the vast literature on simple robust rules.
Indeed, Kahn (2012) provides a thorough documentation on how simple Taylor-type rules have in ‡uenced the FOMC decisions and how they are used as cross-checks to the interest rate decisions in many central banks. An illustrative example is the FOMC meeting in January 31-February 1 1995, where the Greenbook suggested a 150 basis points increase of the federal funds rate to 7 percent. FOMC member Janet Yellen expressed the following concern: "I do not disagree with the Greenbook strategy. But the Taylor rule and other rules. . . call for a rate in the 5 percent range, which is where we already are. Therefore, I am not imagining another 150 basis points".
2 Similar references to the Taylor rule can also be found from policy meetings in other central banks. 3 We will therefore argue that a realistic description of the monetary policy process is optimal policy using all available information, but where simple rules are used as cross-checks (or guidelines While the existing literature on robustness assumes either optimal policy or full commitment to a simple robust rule, we take an intermediate approach. We introduce a modi…ed loss function extended with a term penalizing deviations of the interest rate from the level implied by a simple rule. 4 Our approach is inspired 2 Kahn notes that, "[a]s it turned out at the meeting, the federal funds rate target was raised 50 basis points to 6 percent, where it stayed until July 1995 when it was cut to 5 3 4 percent." 3 For example, Deputy Governor at the Riksbank, Svante Öberg, expressed on the monetary policy meeting December 14, 2010 : "With GDP growth of over 5 per cent, more or less normal resource utilisation, and in ‡ation and in ‡ation expectations at around 2 per cent, it feels slightly uncomfortable to have a repo rate of 1.25 per cent. A traditional Taylor rule would in the present situation result in a repo rate of 3 to 4 per cent" (Riksbank, 2011, p. 8) . 4 Since we …rst circulated our paper there have been other contributions using our combined approach. See Tillmann (2011) and Bursian and Roth (2012) .
by Rogo¤'s (1985) seminal paper on the optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate target, in which he argues that "it is not generally optimal to legally constrain the central bank to hit its intermediate target (or follow its rule) exactly" (p.1169). While Rogo¤'s proposal was aimed to reduce the in ‡ationary bias under discretion, we consider partial commitment to rules aimed to make policy more robust. In other words, we analyze whether the loss across di¤erent models tends to be lower if the central bank minimizes a modi…ed loss function with weight on a simple rule. The idea of extending the loss function with a term with a simple interest rate rule is novel, but the idea of robustifying optimal policy through modi…ed loss functions is not new. Orphanides and Williams (2008) show that a loss function with reduced weight on the unemployment gap and on interest rate stability is more robust to wrong assumptions about private agents'expectations formation (i.e., rational expectations vs. learning). Our approach of using cross-checks in the modi…ed loss function is also related to Beck and Wieland (2009) . They consider a policy where the central bank conducts optimal policy in "normal" times, but extends the loss function with a money growth term when money growth is outside a critical range. Our speci…cation di¤ers in using simple interest rate rules, rather than money growth, as cross-check and by letting the simple rule always enter the operational loss function and not only when the deviation is outside a critical range.
The novelty of our modi…ed loss function is that it builds a bridge between the two alternative monetary policy approaches; optimal policy and simple robust rules As we will show, backward looking models imply very di¤erent monetary policy as far as inertia is concerned and they therefore represent a natural alternative to the largely forward looking reference model.
We consider di¤erent simple rules, including the classical Taylor rule, an optimal simple Bayesian rule, which minimizes the (weighted) average of the losses in the di¤erent alternative models, and a minimax rule, which minimizes the maximum loss in the alternative models. We …nd that placing a weight on either of the rules, the central bank can insure against very bad outcomes if the reference model is wrong. Even if the simple Bayesian rule and the minimax rule are derived optimally using the alternative models, the classical Taylor rule, with the coe¢ cients of 1:5 on in ‡ation and :5 on the output gap, does surprisingly well and not signi…cantly worse than the simple optimized rules. Another interesting …nding is that the weight on a simple rule is always strictly smaller than one. Thus, a robust monetary policy is to lean towards simple rules, but not follow them mechanically. We therefore …nd support for the common view among proponents of simple rules, that they should be used as guidelines, but not as mechanical formulas for the interest setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the reference model and the two alternative models. Section 3 describes the approach of optimal monetary policy with cross-checking and Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
A reference model and two alternative models
The analysis uses three distinct estimated macroeconomic models for the US economy. The models are taken from the new model data base described in Taylor 
The Smets and Wouters (2007) model
The Smets Medium scale DSGE models have had a great in ‡uence on the model development both in academia and policy institutions, and many central banks use such models as the core model for forecasting and policy analysis. The main advantage of these models is that they combine the property of being structural, which facilitates interpretation and story telling, and having forecasting properties comparable with VARs. Given the in ‡uence of these models on monetary policymaking in practice,
we let the reference model of the policymaker be represented by SW.
The Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) model
The 
where y t and t denote the output gap in period t and the rate of in ‡ation, respectively. The nominal interest rate is denoted i t , " t is a cost-push shock and t is a demand shock. The variables with bars are de…ned as four-quarter averages. We have re-estimated the model over the same sample as the Smets-Wouters model, i.e.,
1966:1 to 2004:4, where we used the original parameter estimates as priors. Table 1 shows the new parameter estimates.
[ Table 1 about here]
The Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model
The Fuhrer and Moore model (FM hereafter) is a small, closed-economy model with partly forward-looking and partly backward-looking expectations and is often claimed to provide a good description of in ‡ation persistence. The model assumes overlapping wage contracts, where the price level today, p t , re ‡ects the contract wages, x t , negotiated in quarter t 1, i.e.,
where f i 0 and P f i = 1. The weights on each contract weight is a downwardsloping linear function of contract length according to:
The index of real wage contracts that were negotiated on the contracts currently in e¤ect is given by
Agents set nominal wage contracts so that the current real contract wage equals the average real contract wage index expected to prevail over the life of the contract, but where the degree of pressure in the economy, captured by the output gap y t , a¤ects the negotiated wage:
where > 0 and " t is a white noise shock. Aggregate demand (the output gap) is given by y t = a 1 y t 1 + a 2 y t 1 + a t 1 + " y;t ;
) is the long-term real interest rate and D is a constant approximation to Macaulay's duration
The model is re-estimated using the original parameter values as priors, and the results are reported in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 about here]
Monetary policy
In this section we start by describing optimal policy and the objectives of the central bank. We then describe the simple interest rate rules used in the analysis below and proceed with a description of optimal monetary policy with cross-checking by simple rules. This set-up modi…es the objective of the central bank to include a penalty for deviations from a simple interest rate rule. We end the section with a description of the simulation set-up.
Optimal policy
We assume that the central bank minimizes the intertemporal loss function:
where is the time discount factor. The period loss function L t is a quadratic function of the variables entering the model. We assume that the central bank has access to a commitment technology, i.e., monetary policy is conducted under commitment.
The central bank minimizes the intertemporal central bank loss function subject to the constraints given by the model. The characterization of optimal policy is standard, and we refer to Svensson (2010) for a description. Generally, optimal policy is given by a set of …rst-order conditions and the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints.
The objectives of monetary policy are represented by the following (ad hoc) period loss function:
The parameters 0 and 0 give the central bank's weight on stabilizing the output gap and the change in the interest rate, respectively, relative to stabilizing in ‡ation. If there is no model uncertainty, the central bank should minimize the loss function (7) subject to the constraints given by its reference model. Under imperfect knowledge of the economy, it might not always be the case that the central bank should minimize (7). We thus consider modi…ed loss functions that deviate from (7) with the aim of making optimal policy more robust.
Simple rules
It is possible to derive an implied instrument rule from the …rst-order conditions describing optimal policy. However, such rules are usually complicated and very model-speci…c. Simple rules, on the other hand, are based on a smaller and more restricted set of variables. Although not being optimal, simple rules are often considered more robust than optimal policy. We restrict the attention to the sub-class of Taylor-type rules considered by Taylor and Wieland (2012) . Speci…cally, the simple rules have the following form (where we disregard constant terms):
where parameters a i , a , a y , a y 1 measure the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to changes in the corresponding macroeconomic variable.
We consider three types of simple rules. First, we consider optimal simple rules from a Bayesian model averaging perspective, i.e.,
where p m is the weight (probability) attached to a given model m and M is the set of alternative models. Second, we consider the optimal minimax rule, where the coe¢ cients are optimized to give the minimum loss in the model that implies the maximum loss, i.e.,
One objection to the minimax rule and the Bayesian rule is that they are optimized within a given set of models and may thus be only robust across the models within that particular set. One solution is to use rules that are not optimized within a particular set of models, but have "reasonable" parameter values. One such rule is the classical Taylor rule, where a = 1:5, a y = 0:5, a i = a y 1 = 0, which we therefore include in the set of simple rules.
Optimal monetary policy with cross-checking
The two alternative approaches to monetary policy are motivated from two distinct perspectives. Optimal policy is designed to give the maximum achievement of the central bank's objectives given its best knowledge of the functioning of the economy.
Simple (robust) instrument rules are designed to avoid bad policy outcomes. Next, we show how the two approaches can be combined in a way that makes optimal policy more robust, or, alternatively, simple rules more optimal. We denote this optimal policy with cross-checking.
The starting point is the central bank loss function, which is extended with a term penalizing deviations from a simple interest rate rule:
where is the weight on the deviation from the simple instrument rule. For expositional reasons, it is useful to re-write the loss function as a weighted average of the loss function, L t , and the deviation from the simple rule, i.e.,
where =
1+
. Our modi…ed loss function could be interpreted as optimal policy with guidance from simple rules. This seems to be a reasonable description of how simple rules are used as cross-checks in practice, as described in Kahn (2012) . An alternative interpretation is that the central bank uses a simple rule as a benchmark, but deviates from it when it …nds it appropriate to do so. Our proposal can thus be interpreted as optimal deviations from a simple rule.
Monetary policy with cross-checking has also been considered by Beck and Wieland (2009). They did not, however, consider simple interest rate rules as crosschecks, but instead analyzed the case where the monetary policymaker conducts optimal policy in "normal times", but extends the loss function with a money growth term when money growth is outside an estimated critical range. 5 The most common rationale for modi…ed loss functions is to improve the discretionary solution when the central bank is not able to commit, as initiated by Rogo¤ (1985) . If the central bank is in fact credible and able to commit, this rationale for modi…ed loss function disappears and the central bank should not aim to minimize a modi…ed loss function. However, as mentioned in the introduction, modi…ed loss functions have been suggested also as a way to robustify optimal policy, see Orphanides and Williams (2008) . They show that lowering the weight on the unemployment gap and on interest rate smoothing increases robustness if expectations are characterized by adaptive learning instead of rational expectation as in the core model. 6 
Simulation setup
In order to study robustness of monetary policy, we proceed as follows. We derive optimal monetary policy in the reference model, i.e. SW, and use this policy to compute the implied loss in both the reference model and the alternative models.
Optimal policy is derived using the modi…ed loss function, that is, under the assumption of optimal monetary policy with cross-checking. Our rationale for minimizing a modi…ed loss function is to provide better achievement of the underlying objectives, represented by (7) , when the reference model is wrong. When we compute the implied losses to assess the robustness of the (modi…ed) optimal policies, we therefore use the loss function (7).
Since the alternative models do not have the same set of variables, it is not possible to apply the optimal targeting rule from SW to the other models. We will therefore follow Orphanides and Williams (2008) and approximate optimal policy by an interest rate rule based on the three variables which enter all models, namely 5 Christiano and Rostagno (2001) also use money growth as a cross-check. They assume that the central bank sets interest rates according to a Taylor rule in "normal" times, but changes to money growth targeting if money growth is outside critical range. 6 Orphanides and Williams note, however, that their approach can be generalized to include additional variables in the modi…ed loss function, but leave this for future research. in ‡ation, the output gap, and the interest rate. To capture the possibly complicated dynamics of optimal policy, we allow for a quite generous lag structure, i.e.,
The rule which approximates fully optimal policy under commitment thus has 14 parameters, and this rule gives an expected loss that gets very close to the expected loss under optimal policy. 7 
Results
The main objective is to analyze robustness of optimal policy with cross-checking.
To this end we compute expected losses in each model using policy derived under the modi…ed loss function in the reference model with di¤erent weights attached to the simple rule. As the benchmark loss function, we use = 0:5 and = 0:1. 
The classical Taylor rule
We consider …rst the case where the policymaker places weight on the classical Taylor rule. Disregarding the constant terms, the rule is given by i t = 1:5 t + 0:5y t :
The classical Taylor rule is an interesting benchmark for two reasons. First, there is evidence that monetary policymakers indeed place weight on the Taylor rule, see
Kahn (2012) and Ilbas, Røisland and Sveen (2012). Second, it is interesting to
analyze the extent to which placing a weight on a simple rule that is not optimized for any of the models considered, still could provide some insurance against model uncertainty.
7 For simulation purposes we use Dynare, which can be downloaded from the website www.dynare.org. The optimal coe¢ cients are found by a grid search algorithm developed by Junior Maih. We thank him for providing us with the MatLab code. 8 As a robustness check of our results, we also consider alternative weights. Those results are available upon request.
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 shows the average loss, measured by the loss function (7) An interesting result is that the Bayesian loss has its minimum also at 0:55.
Although this depends on the weights attached to the various models, the minimum loss tends to be achieved for in the range between 0:4 and 0:6 for any reasonable set of weights on the models. Thus, given this set of alternative models, an appropriate weight on the Taylor rule does not depend too much on whether one takes a minimax or Bayesian perspective. Therefore, the optimal weight on the Taylor rule is in this set of models independent of the degree of ambiguity aversion.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Optimal simple rules
Next we consider the implications of placing a weight on optimal simple rules. As explained above, we consider rules derived under both Bayesian model averaging and minimax policy.
Optimal Bayesian rule
To construct the optimal simple Bayesian rule, we restrict the rule to minimize the weighted loss over the two alternative models, i.e., RS and FM. One could also include SW when minimizing the weighted losses, but since SW is the reference model under which optimal policy is derived, the results become more clear-cut when the robust simple rule is based on only the two alternative models. Placing equal weights on the two alternative models, gives the following optimal simple
Bayesian rule:
= :62i t 1 + 2:17 t + 1:89y t 0:58y t 1 = :62i t 1 + (1 :62) [5:71 t + 3:44y t + 0:53 y t ] :
The simple Bayesian rule exhibits a moderate degree of inertia, represented by the coe¢ cients on the lagged interest rate and on the change in the output gap and a quite aggressive response to in ‡ation and the level of the output gap.
[ Figure 3 about here]
The next step is to …nd the optimal policy in the reference model, using the simple Bayesian rule as a cross-check. Figure 3 shows the losses in the three models as a function of the weight on the optimal simple Bayesian rule in the modi…ed loss function. The loss in RS now becomes …nite for a much smaller weight on the simple rule than in the case of the classical Taylor rule, which re ‡ects that the simple Bayesian rule is more "taylored" for RS. In the limit where the central bank follows the simple rule mechanically, i.e., = 1; the loss in RS is lower than in FM. The reason is that the FM is generally more fault tolerant than the RS for any parameter values, which implies that on the margin there is more to gain by reducing the loss in RS than the loss in FM. The average loss in the two models is thus minimized for a lower loss in RS than the loss in FM. The loss evaluated with the reference model is, however, high when the central bank follows the Bayesian rule mechanically.
[ Figure 4 about here] Figure 4 shows the maximum loss in the three models and the weighted loss as a function of the weight on the Bayesian rule in the modi…ed loss function. We see that the weight 0:15 gives the lowest maximum loss, which is the point where the loss in SW crosses the loss in RS in Figure 3 Our results therefore imply that the central bank can achieve a better outcome by deviating optimally from their robust simple rules.
Optimal minimax rule
The optimal simple minimax rule is given by 
Comparing the optimal minimax rule (14) with the optimal Bayesian rule (13), we see that there is considerably more policy inertia, represented by the coe¢ cient coe¢ cients on i t 1 and y t , in the minimax rule than in the Bayesian rule. The reason is that the Bayesian rule gives a higher loss in FM than in RS. In order to minimize the maximum loss, the minimax rule implies that the loss in FM is reduced until the two losses are equal. Since high inertia is bene…cial in FM, but not in RS, the optimal minimax rule implies more inertia than in the Bayesian rule. However, as the degree of inertia in the minimax rule is only slightly lower than in optimal policy in SW, a larger weight on the minimax rule than on the Bayesian rule is required to make the inertia su¢ ciently low to give dynamic stability in RS, as seen from …gure 5.
[ Figure 5 about here]
From …gure 6 we see that depending on the degree of ambiguity aversion, where the maximum loss and the Bayesian loss represent the extreme cases, an appropriate weight on the optimal simple minimax rule lies in the range [0:85; 0:95]. Although a large weight on the simple rule is required, full commitment to the rule, i.e., = 1, is still not advantageous.
[ Figure 6 about here]
The trade-o¤ between optimality and robustness
To provide insurance against bad outcomes under model uncertainty, the policymaker has to accept a higher loss if the reference model is correct. The insurance premium is determined by the trade-o¤ between the loss in the reference model and the losses in the alternative models. We compare the trade-o¤s implied by the three alternative rules that we consider, i.e., the classical Taylor rule, the optimized Bayesian rule and the minimax rule, by varying the weight on the rule in the modi…ed loss function.
[ Figure 7 about here] Figure 7 shows the trade-o¤ between the loss in the reference model and the average loss in the alternative models, and Figure 8 shows the trade-o¤ between the loss in the reference model and the maximum loss in the alternative models.
One striking result is that the trade-o¤ is generally far less e¢ cient when placing weight on the minimax rule. Only on the part of the trade-o¤ in which the loss in the alternative model is close to the minimum level the minimax rule performs well.
For less extreme preferences for robustness, placing weight on either the Taylor rule or the Bayesian rule gives a better trade-o¤, in the sense that one can achieve both lower loss in the reference model and lower loss in the alternative models than in the case with the minimax rule.
[ Figure 8 about here]
Another somewhat surprising result is that the Taylor rule does not in general
give a worse trade-o¤ than the Bayesian rule, despite the fact that the Bayesian rule is optimized for the speci…c models. Placing a weight on a non-sophisticated rule like the classical Taylor rule as a cross-check, albeit not committing to follow it mechanically, thus seems to be a good insurance policy for a monetary policymaker.
Conclusions
In this paper we propose an approach that constitutes a synthesis of the two alternative, common ways of modelling monetary policy -optimal policy and simple rules.
Our approach can be summarized as minimizing a loss function that is extended by a weight on deviations of the interest rate from the rate implied by a simple robust rule. By varying the weight on the simple rule, one de…nes a continuum between standard optimal policy and commitment to a simple rule. Moreover, based on sim- Bayesian rule and the classical Taylor rule tend to perform better than the optimal minimax rule, when used as a cross-check in the loss function. Note: The table shows the prior distribution, mean and standard errors for the structural parameters and the shock processes (where the standard errors of the shocks are denoted by ). The …nal column reports the posterior mean estimates. In addition, we estimated, but not reported, an extended Taylor type rule as in equation (11) 
